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Countermeasures against income loss, such as reactive investment decisions, are crucial for maintaining high and stable investment 
levels in a society. In our pairwise, reciprocal investment game, such strategy evolution typically leads to investment cycles. We thus 
find that what seems to be rational at the individual level elevates systemic risk at the society level. However, when reactivity – 
diversity – modularity – heterogeneity are employed, separately or combined, stable investment levels can replace boom-bust 
cycles and stabilize investments and incomes at high levels. 
         R defines the balance between the non-reactive or unconditional (ru) 
and the reactive or conditional (rc) investment components, so that: 
► At full reactivity (R = 100%), investments are resumed only for positive incomes
obtained from the previous iteration of an interaction. 
► At low reactivity (R = 0%), unconditional investments can be made during the
interaction even when the previous income is zero. 
At a low reactivity, when the conditional component plays a lesser role in investment 
decisions, no investment is the only stable state, and investments can increase only 
temporarily; hence, investment cycles appear (orange shaded area).  
However, at full reactivity, when the conditional component gains importance for large 
investments, cycles cease and investments become stable. 
         of investment strategies emerges when the strategy innovation rate I 
is increased, measuring how fast agents try out slight variations of their strategies, 
thus increasing strategy polymorphism. 
High strategy diversity can stabilize high investment levels, dampening the boom-
bust cycles that appear at low reactivity in monomorphic populations. 
 H is introduced as a difference in the attributes of modules, 
such as differences in the cost of investment, in module size, in innovation rate, and in 
the pace of social lerning. 
A medium level of heterogeneity facilitates the emergence and stability of high 
investment levels by enhancing the polymorphism of investment strategies, 
decoupling investment decisions across the population, and restraining the spread of 
exuberant or non-investing strategy types even in cases of low modularity. 
Agent 1. Agent 2. 
We study the evolution of reactive investment strategies in 
agent-based models with iterated, pairwise interactions and 
social learning. Reactive strategies allow agents to continuously 
reevaluate and adjust their investments according their income 
obtained from a partnership following the initial, unconditional 
investment. 
We present four ways to mitigate such boom-bust cycles: 
mmunities, with sparse interactions between the resultant modules. 
With modular social structure, systemic risk is reduced, as boundaries between 
modules act as barriers. Investment decision are decoupled across the society, the 
spread of exuberant or non-investing strategy types is restrained, and strategy 
diversity is maintained, providing an efficient countermeasure against boom-bust 
cycles. 
The coevolution of such strategies can induce systemic risk in the form of investment 
cycles. 
